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—Karsh Photo

Exclusive Interview With Former President Eisenhower

WHERE WE ARE— WHERE WE'RE GOING

How do today's national and international problems look to former President Eisenhower?

In this exclusive interview, General Eisenhower applies to world conditions today his knowledge and background gained through his experience of eight years in the White House and a distinguished military career.

The comments run the full gamut—from Khrushchev and Cuba to the space race and "brinkmanship"; from Europe's defenses and nuclear war to the responsibilities of labor in the U. S.

The former President was at his office at Gettysburg, Pa., when interviewed by "U. S. News & World Report."

Q Generally speaking, where do you think we are going from here, General Eisenhower? Do you think we are going to have a war?

A No. I do not think we are going to have a major war.

Q That, of course, is the question which is worrying people—

A I think all of us should start with the conception that the world—every intelligent man in it—is searching for and hoping for peace. We must exhaust every shred of patience and everything else, and then get a new supply of ideas and start in again. We must continue to do it. That is the first requirement.

Q But, looking at the world in general, do you think that the picture has been changed materially by the differences that have arisen between Russia and Red China?

A So far as we are concerned at this moment, no free nation can afford to drop its guard even an inch, and, although we are delighted to see these Sino-Soviet differences develop, the fact is that we have to watch them. That's one of those things that constitutes a major problem, one that must be studied every day. You must watch and see what's happening—and I'm sure that our Government does do this.

But the fact remains that we cannot now make any great change in our over-all policy—our security policies, our alliances and so on—until we see how this Red China problem works out.

Q Do you think that the United States has the military and economic power to retain in the world a commanding position of leadership? Is the Russian economic position more of a threat or less of a threat than it was?

A I would say this: More and more it becomes clear that our economies in the free world have to be coordinated and co-operative if they are to achieve maximum power. The Soviets operate under a single will, a single direction and a single command. Therefore, they can direct their economic development into any one channel or to any one facet.

We, on the contrary, have to cover the waterfront for all our people. If we're intelligent about it, we will do more among the free nations in co-operating economically, just as we try to co-operate militarily. And this problem is not a new one—it's just one that everybody has seen developing since 1945, and I think we still have to co-operate better.

CUBA: "FAR FROM SOLVED"—

Q Looking at this Hemisphere—how long do you think we can permit any European power to continue infiltrating all these countries and stirring up revolutions and violence? Take the case of Cuba, which is 90 miles away—how do we get rid of this kind of problem?

A We don't want to be complacent, of course, and I personally think that we have to keep working on this one. It is far from being solved. But one thing each of us must remember: "Whatever, in time of real crisis, the Government directs, each of us must give his support, because we're going to have to talk with one voice if anything critical does happen."

Now, if we want to go back to history, I don't hesitate to talk about history—

Q Well, right now almost everybody is curious about the answer to the same question: What was Khrushchev's real purpose in putting those missiles in Cuba?

A He wanted to see whether he could find a soft spot in our thinking and our will to resist—and that's all. This

Senator has been asked to find runaway husbands. By enlisting the FBI and the Veterans Administration in the search, he sometimes has been successful.

Often, members of Congress get requests from important constituents for invitations to White House parties. If a member fails to deliver, he sometimes gets a complaint that his office staff is inefficient.

Demands for special services vary from region to region.

Far Western Senators keep their eyes on developments in the mining industry, are besieged with requests from cattlemen for permits to graze their stock on Government-owned lands.

Many Congressmen keep an eye on the tourist business. Others move into action when there is a sag in the price of some commodity produced in their districts.

Congressmen find the Washington social whirl more of a menace than a pleasure. Trade associations and groups of businessmen from back home give numberless dinners in Washington and enlist Congressmen as speakers.

The "rubber chicken" circuit. Some Congressmen call this the "green-pea-and-rubber-chicken banquet circuit." If a member accepts an invitation to one such affair, he finds himself trapped and feels obliged to accept other such invitations.

There are some members, however, who make it a rule to give a flat "No" to most such invitations.

What the situation boils down to is this: The whole concept of the duty of a member of Congress has changed since the Federal Government began to pour billions of dollars into the nation's economy and take actions that affect every citizen.

In 1926, Representative Robert Luce of Massachusetts said: "The lawmaker is not to be purely an agent, vainly trying to decide what a majority of his principals desire."

Nowadays, many members of Congress regularly poll their constituents in an effort to learn what legislation they favor.

One member, speaking very privately, gives this view of his office:

"My first duty is to get re-elected. I'm here to represent my district. This is part of my actual belief as to the function of a Congressman."

Another member put it this way:

"I'm from a big city. As long as my office back home handles the little requests for visas and Social Security, I can vote as I please down here. No one back home pays any attention." **[END]**

EISENHOWER OBSERVATIONS

In search of peace: *"We must exhaust every shred of patience and everything else, and then get a new supply of ideas and start in again."*

National unity: *"Whatever, in time of real crisis, the Government directs, each of us must give his support, because we're going to have to talk with one voice."*

Space race: *"Let's not take a matter that's purely scientific in its character and in its objectives and make it suddenly a competition with some other nation—or make it a stunt."*

European allies: *"They ought to be doing more, in my opinion, to strengthen their own defenses."*

Labor: *"Some of our trade-union leaders are not taking the time to look at the total welfare of the United States."*

entire episode wasn't any victory for us or a final settlement, of course. It was just telling this fellow, "Don't push us any further. We're getting tired of it." And so he retired—and that was that.

But, you see, we've still got Castro and Communism. From the Soviet angle this was a very fine move for Khrushchev; I'm delighted to see he was made to move back. It's just like the Communists, however. They will try anything, and if they see you are not going to resist, why, they'll just keep on pressing.

Q It has been estimated that Communist Russia spent many millions of dollars on Cuban missiles. What must have been their purpose in spending all that money?

A Well, I don't think it is quite that simple. They have these missiles, they have soldiers, they have all these things. It costs them nothing, relatively speaking—except probably the Soviet people pay for this through a lower standard of living for the following year. Their rulers don't care anything about that.

The Communists have a big world program, and they operate it by probing, pushing, trying here and there and so on. Way back in 1948 when General Clay said, "We'll never abandon Berlin," they began to look for a way to settle the thing. And it is always that way. They push and probe everywhere, and that is what this was.

Q What do you think we should do?

A This is something I don't want to talk too much about—it is difficult for any private citizen to do so—but I will say this: I believe we have to make a policy and stick with it. And I think these various problems that come up in Laos and the Congo and so on have to be taken in turn, according to the merits of the case. But we have to have the basic policy that we are going to protect freedom and that we are going to help people who will really fight for their freedom. I don't think we can carry the whole world on our shoulders, especially if some of the countries don't want us to pursue that policy.

Look how India has changed. India now is forgetting nonalignment. They are fighting against the Communist Chinese, and you have a different story. It is now a different policy which prevails in that area.

But here, again, the question of just what the Communists are going to do, what their thinking is, as a matter of fact, just exactly what are the facts in a particular situation are things that civilians like ourselves cannot be privy to now. We don't really know what is going on in given areas.

So I think, in India's immediate future, we have to say to ourselves, "Well, we must trust our Government. We don't know what others are going to do, and we certainly can't be people who want to cut our Government down when it tries to do something in a crisis."

Q Do you think that, if the armament expense continues in the Soviet Union, they will have internal problems? Are we in a position, by keeping up this competition, to cause them considerable trouble, internally, by this armament race?

A Well, I am sure that both nations are paying quite a heavy price for this thing, and I think that, in the long run, the Soviets are paying more than we are.

In our military affairs, I believe that we ought to keep on planning, and saying to ourselves: "Now, what is our next five-year program?" And we must try to stay steady. We don't increase our efforts every time the Russian bear yaks and snarls. And if it looks like he has gone back a little bit, we must not cut down our strength. Backing and filling, responding to every Soviet move, is, to my mind, the most expensive thing you can do, and it tends to indicate that we are people who are fearful and jumpy. We want a steady military program, so we can say to the other side, "This is what we want and what we need. We are not going to spend $1 more than necessary, but you had better not take us for an easy mark because we have the stuff to take care of ourselves."

MORE HELP FROM EUROPE—

Q Do you think that we can develop more strength through our North Atlantic Treaty Organization concept? Are we progressing in that direction?

A I think that the European part of NATO should bear in mind that the Americans cannot be forever deployed all around the world just *in situ*—fixed there. We are showing our flag in Europe. We show that we are committed to their defense on that edge of the free world. I think the NATO members in Europe have got to do more in maintaining the military types that are not readily transportable. In other words, I am not sure that the land forces that we, ourselves, are keeping in Europe ought not gradually to be reduced. I have always thought they were sent there in the first instance for emergency purposes and to afford Europe time to build their defensive measures themselves.

We ought to keep enough ground force there to show that we are really serious—that the Soviets know that we are serious, and so are our friends. The NATO countries

. . . "Only firmness can keep us out of war"

are prosperous now. They ought to be doing more, in my opinion, to strengthen their own defenses.

Q Going back to a word we used to hear a lot about—the "brink" or "brinkmanship"—did we come right up to the brink in Cuba? Was there any comparable moment in your eight years when we were on the edge of something very critical?

A Well, this you never fully know. We just believed, in my Administration, the only way we can keep peace is to take a real stand—Lebanon, Formosa, Korea—remember we were still at war when I came to the White House! And this was clear: Either the Korean War was going to have to be soon terminated under the negotiations then going on or it was going to have to be extended in scope and character—one of the two. So every day—or certainly every year—brought its own incidents that could have been touch and go. You didn't know—and particularly in the latter years.

Now, on this matter of "brinkmanship," the fact of it is, you do have to go to the brink of war to show people that you stand firm; only firmness can keep us out of war. I mean, from our viewpoint you go to the brink, because you show that your will to defend yourself will not be broken. Now, when the Soviets make threats, what do you do? If that isn't the brink, it will do to call it the brink until some better word is manufactured.

Q Have we reached the point where an actual nuclear war is simply impossible because both sides would be destroyed? Should the people be as scared as they are when actually neither side would dare to begin a nuclear war?

A Since we don't intend to trade nuclear stockpiles and they certainly don't want to, I think the danger becomes remote.

Q Then what kind of war might we expect?

A Let's look at it across the board for a moment: People say, "Well, as long as you have a nuclear stalemate you won't engage in that kind of war. So, let's fight some other way."

Well, the falsity of such a view is this: If you are going to fight in a number of places and more intensively—even though "conventionally"—until finally you reach the point where you are getting extended and are moving toward full mobilization, then you are getting into a major war—one where your existence or your way of life is at stake. So you begin to ask, "When are you going to use nuclear force?" We say to ourselves, "We've got to resort to these things that we know we can do something about. We feel

EISENHOWER: SOLDIER-STATESMAN

Dwight D. Eisenhower's career as public servant spans the half century from his appointment to West Point in 1911 to his retirement from the White House in 1961. In those 50 years Mr. Eisenhower served the U. S. in many capacities, in war and peace. On these pages: some of the highlights.

1915 was the year Cadet Eisenhower graduated from West Point—and the year he met Mamie Doud. They were married on July 1, 1916.

1935: With General MacArthur in the Philippines. Eisenhower, as a major, caught the eye of America's leading military figure, served under General MacArthur in Washington, from 1935 to 1939 in Manila.

1943: In Tunisia with Gen. George Patton. When war broke out, Gen. George Marshall chose Eisenhower for future field command, brought him to Washington. In 1942 General Eisenhower was named to lead the first major Allied offensive in the European Theater—the invasion of North Africa.

1944—year of the biggest military operation of all time—planned and directed by Eisenhower. He is shown with U. S. troops ready to invade Europe.

. . . Needed: "conventional forces to take care of local crisis"

we're getting pushed around and exhausted. What else is there to do?" And possibly the other fellow is thinking the same way.

So I believe this business of nuclear armament, or a nuclear race, really compels us, finally, to find a better way to settle our problems than war. I think we must continue to seek ways of making peace, undeterred by the discouragements and the defeats that we have had so far in pushing such ideas, such programs and such efforts. We must continue to try until the Russian people have enough influence, finally, on their leaders to say, "Here, we have got to be a little more sensible."

Q You have always had some thoughts on whether or not we should build up conventional forces on the theory that we might never have a nuclear war anyway, but the other fellow might start conventional wars—

A We ought to have enough conventional forces to take care of any local crisis important to our interests—some sudden and unexpected sort of conflict. In addition we do have for a while—for the present, certainly—to keep certain garrisons that are now being maintained by us around the world.

But, if this theory is our sole policy in defense, then the other fellow can just keep us engaged around the periphery of Eurasia with little attacks, using either satellites or his own forces. You become exhausted in all this indecisive fighting in so many areas of the world.

I believe that you must say, "We'll take care of these little things," but, when they grow in number, then that is a big war. Then we must say, "Here we are, but we will not let ourselves run down the drain, with the other fellow having the initiative and making us respond." We are, of course, not going deliberately to attack the Soviets; any great conflict will never be of our making.

Q But in a matter of survival, in such a conventional war, if the other fellow is exterminating you, is it your idea that we use whatever weapons we can?

A Indeed, that is correct.

Q Then that is how the concepts of conventional and unconventional forces blend?

A Yes.

Q General Eisenhower, since you are the only man alive today who has been President of the United States and also commander in chief in the field of the biggest military force we ever had—and we can't always have a military man in the White House—what do you think is the best way prompt decisions can be made in a grave military situation? Should the members of the Joint

1948—and retirement for Eisenhower. With the war over, he was named Army Chief of Staff in 1945, served until 1948. Then, in this ceremony at Fort Myer, Va., Eisenhower saluted the colors—and became a civilian.



1948. A new job and a high honor awaited Mr. Eisenhower on retirement. In New York City, he received the keys and charter of Columbia University, became its president.



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1951 marked the return of General Eisenhower to active duty, to command forces in Europe under the North Atlantic Pact.

1953: from soldier to President. Mr. Eisenhower at his desk in the White House shortly after election to his first term.

1955: heart attack. Illness raised doubts about a second term, but Mr. Eisenhower recovered and announced he would run.

1957: After an increased margin at the polls, a second inauguration.

1963: Ike and Mamie in retirement on their farm near Gettysburg.

. . . A critical decision "shouldn't be an impulsive thing"

Chiefs of Staff be in regular consultation with the President in the process of decision making, especially when there's a military problem involved, such as happened twice in the Cuban situation?

A These problems, comprising so many different and vital political, psychological and military factors—these matters can be solved only when the individuals concerned are constantly aware of "living" the developing situation.

If you were actually in a war, and the opposing forces were maneuvering, you would try to keep aware of the situation every instant, so when finally a decision had to be made it wouldn't be an impulsive thing. You would have your most trusted advisers, your intelligence people, your logistics people, your operations people, talking to you all the time.

Now, in staffs always there are differing views of these problems. Some people will be fearful about the costs of an attack or a battle—others will be unduly sanguine. When I was in the White House, what I did was to listen to these differing considerations—as they are advanced and presented and argued—right in front of me.

I don't believe a commander can afford to talk, one at a time, with advisers who hold widely differing views. If one believed you should attack and talked to his chief one hour, while the next hour somebody else said, "Well, we should move back and play this cozy a little while"—the boss would hardly get to the bottom of the whole problem. But, if he hears the two proponents of the conflicting ideas arguing them in front of him, his information becomes more complete and presented in better perspective.

I think that such discussions, in developing situations, have to be periodic, so that the man in charge is always well aware of every important facet of the problem. So when the decision has to be made—with all these State Department, international, political, military and psychological points of view in mind—he is ready to decide. In other words, he has become a "prepared" individual.

WHY A COUNTRY FIGHTS—

Q What about a military situation like Cuba? For instance, you learn that the enemy is carrying materials and ammunition, armament, bomber planes, to a base not far away. Isn't that a military problem per se, or is it an international political problem that takes precedence over the military?

A Of course, military action is only the carrying on of political policy by other means, as Clausewitz said—and that statement is correct. You don't fight just to fight. You fight to achieve some political objective.

Q But, in an atomic age, when they say it's a matter of minutes in which you have to make a decision, shouldn't you have at your elbow all the time the military chiefs, and can't they decide the military questions?

A Oh, yes, of course, so far as military strategy and tactics are concerned. Now, you suggest the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be "right at your elbow." That's perfectly true. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the military advisers of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and they ought to be always available.

Q Under the law, of course, the Joint Chiefs are not officially members of the Security Council, though one or more of the chiefs of the different armed services can be informally invited to attend—

A Well, in my opinion, certainly periodically, the decisive authority should have the JCS all together at appropriate times to listen to their arguments, because there are arguments among them. Though all may agree that a military operation may be appropriate, one will want to accomplish a mission by bombing, another one says, "You ought to occupy the places by invasion," and another one says, "You ought to blockade." This may be because of different training and backgrounds.

The boss can scarcely make a trustworthy decision if he consults just one man—he must listen to all, even though he later delegates one man responsibility for carrying out the operation.

"DEPEND ON MILITARY MEN"—

Q Mr. Truman and Mr. Roosevelt had all the Joint Chiefs at their elbow during the war—they didn't have any civilian in between like the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaries of the armed services—

A That's right. As a matter of fact, I think when it comes down to the true military side of it that is correct. You have to depend upon military men. There is no group that better can sift out and work out for the President a military view than the pros. And so, finally, you naturally put your personal adviser—like Admiral Leahy, who was, in effect the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in the case of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman—at your elbow. You can let such a man be the daily contact, seeing the other Chiefs every hour, if necessary, in hot cases. But always, if you sense that there's anything going, or likely to go, wrong, you should listen to these military people.

Before a battle you can assemble subordinate commanders in chief and their chiefs of staff, and you can have a dozen people in for free discussion. But I think that the big thing is to assure that the man who has to make the decisions is kept constantly informed of what can happen—all the various avenues of approach to the problem. As the facts begin to develop in their entirety the answer often becomes obvious.

Q Well, now, when you decided to land marines in Lebanon in 1958, did it take several weeks to make that decision, or did you make it rather promptly?

A Here's a perfect example of what I'm talking about. I had been studying that problem for days, and there was only one thing in the way, and it was this: President Camille Chamoun, you will remember, was initially undecided as to whether or not he wanted any troops to come in. And finally we got word from him that he wanted them.

Now, promptly after we knew that he wanted them, the answer was made. I said, "Here we go"—for the simple reason that all during the time we had been studying

. . . "Approach space in scientific—not showmanship—way"

the matter, we were aware that they needed military help. Also, we knew how and when it could be provided, but we could not move until the properly constituted, free Government in Lebanon said, "We want your help."

You can't go to save a country that doesn't want to be saved. And so there was no difficulty with that particular decision whatsoever, for the simple reason that we had studied and were prepared both to start and to see it through.

Q Taking the matter of an enemy's landing weapons somewhere to attack you, do you wait until the weapons are in place, or do you try to prevent the landing of weapons by the enemy? That's a simple military consideration, isn't it?

A You're taking the Cuban situation as an example, I suppose. The first public statement by the President was that there was nothing in Cuba but defensive weapons. I think what was missing in that case was this: What should you calculate as to intentions? If you hear that these modern defenses are being put in, you certainly don't expect them to be used to defend Cuba by herself from such a power as the United States—assuming we really wanted to attack. Therefore, you ask yourself, "What was the Soviet purpose in doing all this?"

So, while the weapons themselves, so far as the reconnaissance could show, might be defensive, what is the real purpose of the whole movement? You see?

Now, there's one thing more: Certainly from the time of the Bay of Pigs this subject should never have been—and probably never was—absent for a single day from some kind of study or discussion or debate within appropriate parts of the Government, because it was obviously a situation that, in the long run, was dangerous to the best interests of the American States.

Q Should we not have had surveillance constantly on that for a long time?

A Oh, I think so—I should suppose we did, and have.

HOW CASTRO WARNED U. S.—

Q But, as a military matter, if you know the enemy is located there, do you wait until he gets his missiles all ready to shoot before you do anything?

A I don't want to comment too much; but I do reiterate: To make a proper decision in such matters must really be done through thorough study. Sometimes things come up very suddenly. But we knew, at least, that we had had this trouble—we had gone through the Bay of Pigs episode—and then we had, months later, another sign. Castro openly said he was a Communist, and that put us on notice—a warning.

Then, later, we began to see these armaments come in, and, finally, the President made a speech on October 22 last, disclosing his decision.

I'm showing only that there were developments in this situation that compelled daily study. So, whatever the decision was to be, there was no great reason at the moment of its making for worrying about anything new or special.

Facts and the final decision often develop gradually, as the situation evolves. And I [illegible] per-

fect way for human judgment to be applied to this kind of problem. But I do know that the man who is constantly prepared through working with all his advisers, including the military, to make those decisions makes them more easily and probably more wisely than someone who just looks upon them as a new problem coming up every day. And when the Soviets saw they had led a losing card, they quit.

WHERE POLICY IS MADE—

Q Since the military men brought into such councils are a minority, and the rest of the advisers are all civilians, it might be wondered whether we give enough weight to military strategy, now that we don't have a military man in the White House—

A Oh, no, I don't think that, such a conclusion by itself, would be a clear deduction.

I think this: If we give the proper respect to our professional military people—if we think of them not only as trained military men but as educated people, as patriotic and dedicated and selfless as any citizens we can find, then their opinions are of the utmost worth. But military men are, after all, a tool of policy—they are not makers of policy.

Since they are tools of policy, their attitude is, "This is what we can do. This is what it will cost. Here are the probable results."

Now, the highest authority has got to decide what is the effect of a military proposal on international politics, on the psychological reactions among our own people, on our standing in the world, our prestige and all the rest of it. However, when it comes down to direct danger to the United States of America, then the military view becomes, I think, more and more important in this complex equation that has to be solved.

Q Now, switching over to the problem of outer space, we read nowadays that we are going to spend something like 20 or even 40 billion dollars in the next 10 years to try to put an American on the moon. How do you establish a priority between going to the moon and maybe getting certain other equipment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for instance, all say they want? But somebody else says it's more important for propaganda purposes and prestige to go to the moon. What do you say in a case like that?

A First of all, I believe this thoroughly, and I've said it many times—that we ought to approach scientific explorations into space in a scientific—not a showmanship—way. Let's not take a matter that's purely scientific in its character and in its objectives and make it suddenly a competition with some other nation—or make it a stunt. I don't believe in spectaculars.

Now, I do believe that there should be a steady research and development into the things that are needed by us in space, and as these things go on and we experiment with them, there will be finally developed, as a by-product of scientific study, an ability to do almost anything that is conceivable in space.

[illegible] we should not set aside some

. . . "Washington is getting too pervasive in our lives"

great sum just to say, "Now, we're going to do this project by such-and-such time." I do not believe in that. I believe that there ought to be—and my own scientific advisers used to tell me—a steady development in this area. And remember, we didn't get into this until after we had found out through scientific studies about possibilities as well as what was going on elsewhere. We went into it seriously and finally reached the conclusion that somewhere between 1.5 billion and 2 billion dollars annually probably would have to be spent for a good many years, as a sort of regular charge on the budget. This, I came to believe would be a reasonable, progressive and worthwhile program. It would be a product of our own needs and plans, not of impulse or panic.

Now, they've gotten up to—something—approximately 4 billion dollars this year and it promises to go up more.

I think that's too much money spent in the space program. Things that are useful to us in space—communications, reconnaissance, meteorology and all that sort of thing—those are the things that I think should be taking the mass of our scientific attention. Let the other and more dramatic possibilities develop, you might say, as by-products of all the knowledge we progressively gain.

Q What do you think of the rise in the nondefense spending that has been going on? Chairman Cannon of the House Appropriations Committee recently showed how, in the last several years, the nondefense items had increased faster than the military. Do you think that's the right trend?

A As a matter of fact, I think that all expenditures are going up too fast. We are spending because there seems to be a belief that spending by the Government is a very valuable thing in our economy; I don't think so. I believe if we've got money to spend, the people of the United States—guided by the forces and influence of a free market and competition—will spend it far better than the Government.

Now, the Government today is increasing all nondefense items—as well as our defense items and our space items—all of them are going up. I feel this is a bad trend. People talk about reducing taxes, but how are you going to reduce taxes under such a condition right today? I would like to see a very substantial tax cut, but I would like to see it accompanied by a sufficient reduction in our expenditures right across the board—I don't care where they fall—but particularly including nondefense items. The aggregate reduction need not necessarily be equal in amount to the tax cut, but it would show the sincerity of the Government in getting our fiscal affairs on a sane and sound basis.

Q Do you think there is developing in the country at the moment a centralization of power because of the tremendous amounts of money spent directly or allocated to the States by the central Government?

A Well, there's no question about the uneasiness that's developing under this centripetal force that's carrying everything to Washington. All through the 1962 campaign—I visited, I think it was, 22 States—I heard the matter talked and discussed all the time, and I think it still is. I was at a meeting recently of a number of businessmen and others—professional people and educators—in Pennsylvania here, and this subject was discussed a number of times. You can have no serious conversation with any group today without someone bringing up this fact—that Washington is getting too pervasive in our lives.

Q Isn't there a development, too, of pressure groups in our country today?

A Yes, I think so. For example, I just read in my local paper here recently that we're going to increase price supports for the farm products here in Adams County. I don't understand how we're ever going to get out of the agricultural mess we're in unless we begin to get our agriculture back on a more competitive basis. I tried—with little success.

Q Do you feel that the rise in the economic power of the trade-unions today is a factor in the ups and downs of our economic progress, our recessions and depressions?

A Well, I'll put it this way: Some of our trade-union leaders are not taking the time to look at the total welfare of the United States. With a profit margin going down—and it's out of profits that we build jobs—I do not see any move on the part of the union leaders which says, in effect, "Now, we're going to think first of all of the nation before we begin to lay out before the public a whole series of demands. Our chief concern will be: What is good for the nation?" If we can get union leaders to do that, and get the businessmen, also, to do it, why, I think that then we'll get into a better position, nationally.

Now, I talk to many workmen—these days I have much more opportunity than formerly to talk to people of all walks of life—and I think that, broadly speaking, they're quite contented as to their incomes. They're more uneasy about what might happen to us from abroad than they are worrying about wages.

TO FOIL MOSCOW'S AIMS—

Q Do you think that the economic competition from Europe is going to affect our working people seriously?

A Well, no, I don't think too seriously. But the big thing we must remember in this matter of negotiations with Europe is this: Our enemy in the world is still Communist imperialism—the Communist desire and announced purpose of conquering the world. It would be unfortunate, I think, if we centered our attention too much on just figuring out how we can get an economic advantage over Europe or Europe over us.

I think that what we've got to do is to think of all of these negotiations against this background: The free-world production—that is, the production of Western Europe, the North American continent and Japan—must be strengthened all across the board. These are three great areas of free-world industrialization—these three economies have to co-operate in such a way among themselves as to achieve the maximum economic strength. And if we can do that, we can defeat the Soviet and Communist penetration—including economic pene-